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BNA Insights
SEC and CFTC Joint Rulemakings Under Dodd-Frank – A Regulatory Odd Couple?
REGULATORY REFORM
By Donald N. Lamson and Hilary Allen
Donald N. Lamson is counsel in the Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Group of Shearman &
Sterling LLP in Washington, DC. Prior to joining the firm, he spent more than 30 years at the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, where he specialized in the derivatives, investment, securities, and trust-related
activities of national banks. From 2009-2010 he was detailed to the Treasury Department where he assisted in
drafting a number of titles in the Administration's proposal for financial regulatory reform, including titles related
to derivatives, investor protection and credit ratings, consumer protection, and the Volcker rule. Hilary Allen is a
Shearman & Sterling associate in New York.
By now it is a commonplace that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 1 requires
dozens of agency and interagency implementing rulemakings. Less understood is how difficult it was to design a
viable process for two widely respected agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), to engage in joint rulemakings to implement Title VII, which
governs the regulation of derivatives. Was the process difficult because the CFTC and SEC are so different in
their regulatory approaches, or is the job expected of them so daunting that extensive ground rules are essential
to the task? A review of the alternatives that Congress considered and rejected can help a curious reader
appreciate how Congress expects the SEC and the CFTC to share the responsibility for the regulation of a
huge, previously unregulated market in financial instruments. 2
1 Public Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”).
2 “Landmark Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation Passed By U.S. Congress,” dated July 20, 2010, available at http://w
ww.shearman.com/landmark-financial-regulatory-reform-legislation-07-20-2010/.
Introduction
As Congress determined to regulate the swaps markets, it needed to resolve two competing policy goals: a
desire for efficient, i.e., consistent regulation of the swaps markets, and respect for the differing natures of those
markets and their constituent products. The trade-off gives rise to a related question: should there be one
regulator of U.S. financial markets, or is there room for two regulators, the CFTC and the SEC? 3
3 Whether or not coincidentally, at the height of legislative consideration of the joint rulemaking proposals, the two agencies
formed a Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee to facilitate regular communication between the agencies and promote
regulatory harmonization. See SEC Release No. 33-9123 (May 10, 2010). Notwithstanding this demonstration of
cooperative spirit, as described below, Congress still elected to impose on the two agencies a more formal regime of joint
rulemaking.
A merger of the two agencies had intellectual appeal; the regulation of markets internationally often is entrusted
to a single regulator. 4 This approach recognizes the similarities between products and markets and reduces
the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. At the same time, the presence of two agencies can effectively
recognize the differences inherent in multiple products and markets. Because the idea of a formal agency
merger lacked sufficient political appeal, a compromise was struck; a de facto merger of regulatory principles
and mechanics through joint rulemaking came closest to achieving increased efficiency in regulation, while
simultaneously preserving the status quo.
4 The following countries have only one regulator for their entire financial system, including markets: Austria, Bahrain,
Belgium, Cayman Islands, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Gibraltar, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Maldives, Malta, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Sweden,
Taiwan and UAE. See Elizabeth Brown, “A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the
United Kingdom and Australia,” 55 Vill. L. Rev. 509, 512 (2010). In the wake of the financial crisis, much of the discourse
has criticized the single regulator model, and promoted the “twin peaks” model in place in Australia and New Zealand. None
of the discourse, however, has promoted a move to the functional regulation model in place in United States markets.
SEC and CFTC Jurisdiction
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To appreciate how Congress finally settled on joint rulemaking to resolve those competing concerns, one first
must appreciate the sometimes conflicting nature of the jurisdiction of the SEC and the CFTC. 5 It is convenient
to think of the SEC's jurisdiction as based purely on the regulation of securities, and the jurisdiction of the CFTC
involving only the regulation of commodity futures, but that formulation ignores the middle ground. Rather than
dispute authority over instruments that closely resemble securities or futures, the two agencies typically have
concentrated jurisdictional disputes on instruments that sit in the gray area in the middle of the regulatory or
product spectrum.
5 The problems of conflicting jurisdiction are exacerbated by conflicting agency cultures, as the agencies interpret and apply
similar rules differently. There are well recognized, distinct differences in the cultures and regulatory approaches of the SEC
and the CFTC: the SEC approach tends to be rules-based, while the CFTC approach is principles-based. See Department
of Treasury,“Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation,” (June 17, 2009) (“Financial Regulatory Reform: A New
Foundation”), at 50.
Shad Johnson Accord
An early example of agency conflict in this gray area occurred when the SEC and the CFTC disputed jurisdiction
over futures contracts based on securities. The resolution of this dispute, known as the Shad-Johnson Accord
(“Accord”), was brokered by the Chairmen of the SEC and CFTC in 1981 and then reflected in the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1982 6 and the Futures Trading Act of 1982. 7 Under the Accord, jurisdiction over
securities and securities indices (and options thereon) went to the SEC, and jurisdiction over futures on
securities (including futures based on securities indices and exempt securities, and options thereon) to the
CFTC. 8 The Accord also prohibited the trading of futures on individual stocks (i.e., single stock futures) and
narrow-based indices of securities. 9
6 Public Law No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982).
7 Public Law No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982).
8 Shad-Johnson did not end jurisdictional conflict over securities futures, however. In 1989, the agencies tussled in the
courts over futures that were based on securities indices and traded on securities exchanges, with the Seventh Circuit
finding that the CFTC should have exclusive jurisdiction over any product that combined elements of both futures and
securities products. See Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
9 The prohibition on the trading of single stock futures was not lifted until the enactment of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), which mandated joint CFTC/SEC oversight of single stock futures and futures on
narrow-based security indices. Notwithstanding the Accord, joint agency cooperation in this arena has proceeded slowly,
most particularly with respect to an agreement on margin requirements.
The Swap Markets
The most recent example of jurisdictional conflict between the two agencies involves the swap markets, which
grew explosively over the last few decades. At first there was no direct regulation of the swap markets at the
federal level because Congress was satisfied to employ indirect regulation: the major participants in the
markets, banks, securities firms, and their affiliates, already were regulated directly by the bank regulatory
agencies or the SEC. 10 The CFTC recognized this approach by exempting most of these instruments from its
regulatory oversight in the early 1990s. 11
10 The SEC regulated the derivative activities of the largest securities firms through the Consolidated Supervised Entity
program, which was introduced in 2004 and terminated in 2008.
11 Acting under authority of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, the CFTC exempted from regulation under the
Commodity Exchange Act nonstandardized swap agreements entered into between eligible swap participants that were not
entered into or traded on or through a multilateral transaction execution facility. See17 C.F.R Part 35.
Over time, the increasing size of the swaps markets continued to draw Congressional and regulatory scrutiny,
but Congress confirmed its endorsement of the indirect regulation model. In 2000, rather than divide jurisdiction
over swaps between interested regulators, the CFMA excluded bilaterally traded swaps between sophisticated
parties from regulatory oversight. The exclusion was based on the belief that most swaps were not susceptible
to manipulation and most swap counterparties were sophisticated participants who did not require regulatory
protection in what functioned as a wholesale market. 12
12 Department of Treasury, “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” (March 2008) (“Bush Blueprint”).
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The CFMA also directed the Federal Reserve, the Secretary of the Treasury, the CFTC, and the SEC to study
issues regarding the offering of swaps to retail customers, including the appropriate regulatory structure, if any,
to address related customer protection issues. Congress directed the agencies to submit with the report any
recommendations for legislative action. The agencies, however, were unable to agree on a division of
jurisdiction and they declined to provide recommendations concerning the regulation of retail swaps. 13
13 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Department of Treasury, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
and Securities Exchange Commission, “Joint Report on Retail Swaps” (Dec. 2001).
Given this history, an observer could have anticipated that at some later point the agencies and ultimately
Congress would have to confront the issue of dividing authority over the world of swaps. The somewhat nervous
arrangement where bank regulatory agencies indirectly regulated the swap markets was only a stopgap that did
not anticipate and could not control the events leading to the financial crisis of 2008.
SEC and CFTC Merger
Following the devastating effects of the financial crisis, there was general acceptance that the previously
unregulated market for swaps should or would be subjected to formal regulation. 14 That general understanding
did not extend to the division of jurisdiction between the market regulators. The immediate question for
resolution was whether to pursue a merger of the SEC and CFTC or permit a continuation of the status quo, and
in that event, how were the two agencies to coexist?
14 The most obvious precipitant of Congressional action was the failure of AIG, an entity that accumulated extraordinarily
large positions in credit default swaps but had escaped even indirect regulation.
Administration Proposals
As the crisis unfolded, policymakers dusted off longstanding recommendations to deal with the CFTC/SEC
dispute over jurisdiction by recommending not only the harmonization of securities and futures regulation, but
also the merger of the CFTC and the SEC into one entity. The Bush Administration proposal dealt with the
underlying cultural divide by calling for a merger of regulatory philosophies, with the CFTC's principles-based
approach surviving. 15
15 Bush Blueprint, supra, at 106-112.
By the time the Obama Administration's Treasury Department announced its policy position on the outlines of
financial regulatory reform, the outright calls for consolidation of the two agencies had subsided. Instead, the
SEC and CFTC would maintain their current responsibilities and authorities as market regulators, and there
would be a focus on harmonizing the statutory and regulatory frameworks for futures and securities. 16
16 Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, supra.
The text of the Administration's legislative proposal served as a starting point for the Congress in enacting
Dodd-Frank. This proposal called for extensive joint rulemaking by the SEC and CFTC, including definitions,
and capital and margin rules. Joint rulemakings were to be uniform. In the absence of uniformity, the Treasury
would be empowered to make the rules. 17 Some observers have called the harmonization process a “synthetic
merger.”
17 Obama Administration's combined draft legislation for Financial Regulatory Reform (available at http://www.llsdc.org/
attachments/files/252/Dodd-Frank-Act_Admn-Reg-Reform-Bill.pdf) (“Obama Legislative Proposal”) § 711(c).
Congressional Action
In Congress, the calls for a merger of the CFTC and SEC similarly were louder at first and subsided over time.
Instead of legislating an agency merger, there was a provision in the House bill, as passed, calling for a joint
study by the SEC, CFTC, and Treasury of the desirability and feasibility of establishing a single regulator for all
transactions involving financial derivatives by January 1, 2012. 18 The Senate bill as introduced called for a
study by the Comptroller General of how the CFTC and the SEC implemented the derivatives title, the extent to
which jurisdictional disputes created challenges in implementing the title, and the benefits and drawbacks of
harmonizing laws implemented by the CFTC and SEC and merging those agencies. 19 References to these
studies, however, disappeared from the Senate bill and Dodd-Frank as enacted.
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18 H.R. 4173 as passed on December 11, 2009, § 3005(c).
19 S.3217, as introduced on April 15, 2010, § 763.
There was initial enthusiasm for requiring the SEC and CFTC to adopt identical implementing rules for the
regulation of swaps and security-based swaps, which also diminished. Both the House and the Senate bills,
when first introduced, called for joint rulemakings on a broad range of issues, beyond definitions 20 to
registration and regulation of dealers and major swap (and security-based swap) participants. 21 At first, joint
SEC and CFTC rulemakings were required to have “uniform” results. In the absence of agreement on uniform
rules, Treasury (or, in the Senate bill, the FSOC) would promulgate implementing rules. 22
20 H.R. 4173 as introduced on December 2, 2009, § 3101(b); S.3127 as introduced on April 15, 2010, § 711(b)(1).
21 H.R. 4173 as introduced on December 2, 2009, § 3107; S.3127 as introduced on April 15, 2010, § 717.
22 H.R. 4173 as introduced on December 2, 2009, § 3101(c); S.3127 as introduced on April 15, 2010, § 711(c).
As time progressed, the requirement for uniformity in joint rulemakings was deleted from both bills passed by
the House and the Senate. Also, the number of joint rulemakings was whittled down, so that only the definitional
rulemakings, rules relating to record-keeping 23 and rules relating to capital and margin requirements 24 were
required to be joint. FSOC's tiebreaker authority was limited in the final bill. Apparently, uniformity (and the
potential for ceding rulemaking authority to Treasury) was not politically palatable to the SEC and CFTC, their
constituent groups, or their Congressional oversight committees. 25
23 Section 712 of Dodd-Frank.
24 Section 731 of Dodd-Frank.
25 This approach is a far cry from that taken in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 (Public Law No.
109-351, 120 Stat. 1966 (2006)), when Congress required the SEC and the Federal Reserve to jointly issue a single set
of rules or regulations to define the term “broker” in accordance with section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
One might ask at this point why Congress had the luxury of so many choices in determining how the SEC and
CFTC were to adopt joint rules and why the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), for example, would not
control the form that a joint rulemaking should take. 26 The simple answer is that the APA does not even
address the subject of joint rulemaking. Few courts have dealt with the issue and, as discussed below, judicial
guidance on the subject is sparse and not instructive.
26 Public Law, 79-404, 60 Stat. 238, 5 U.S.C 551.
Dodd-Frank and the Resolution of Jurisdiction
The final version of Dodd-Frank drew bright, but general lines of authority, giving the SEC jurisdiction over all
security-based swaps and the CFTC jurisdiction over all other swaps, much as the Administration originally
proposed. The question naturally follows, at what point along a theoretical continuum does a swap end and a
security-based swap begin? Given that the definitions of ‘swap’ and ‘security-based swap’ are to be fleshed out
by agency rulemakings, this task effectively requires the agencies to agree to demarcate their own jurisdiction.
Congress did recognize the difficulty of the task confronting the two agencies and their history in dealing with
other jurisdictional issues, and created an extensive framework to govern the rulemaking process. However, the
Title VII framework for joint rulemaking raises as many questions as it answers.
Joint Rulemaking
Section 712 of Dodd-Frank governs how the CFTC and the SEC may adopt rules implementing Title VII, and it
mandates cooperation. At a minimum, the agencies cannot individually adopt rules with the effect of intruding on
each other's turf. 27 Instead, the SEC and the CFTC must consult and coordinate on all Title VII rulemakings
within their jurisdiction, plus obtain (and presumably incorporate) the views of “prudential” regulators. 28 There
is a distinction between rulemakings that are still required to be joint (generally those involving definitions), and
those remaining rulemakings subject to a presumably less stringent standard of consultation and coordination.
29
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27 Section 712(a) of Dodd-Frank.
28 The term “prudential regulators” refers to the banking regulatory agencies that have jurisdiction over any swap dealer,
security-based swap dealer, major swap participant or major security-based swap participant that is a bank. The
participation of the prudential regulators in the regulation of the swaps markets will diminish markedly as the provisions of
Dodd-Frank come into effect, because most swap dealers will become futures commission merchants that are regulated by
the CFTC.
29 Section 712(a). This terminology apparently was borrowed from provisions such as Section 241 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 (Public Law No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)) relating to inter-agency coordination and,
assuming there is a difference between the two terms, was presumably more politically palatable than requiring further rules
to be made “jointly.”
The items subject to the joint rulemaking requirement include:
• Definitions of swaps, security-based swaps, security-based swap agreements;
• Definitions of swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, major swap participant, major security-based
swap participant, eligible contract participant;
• Books and records regarding security-based swap agreement;
• Definition of mixed swaps 30
• Other matters that the two agencies choose to subject to joint rulemaking.
30 While the requirement to issue joint rules regarding the definition of “mixed swaps” appears in Section 712(a)(8) of Dodd-
Frank, all other references requiring joint definitional rulemakings are found in Section 712(d) of Dodd-Frank. One possible
explanation for this discrepancy is that the definition of “mixed swaps” was added as an afterthought.
Congress gave only a limited and perhaps conflicting explanation of what a joint rulemaking is: joint rules shall
be comparable to the maximum extent possible, taking into account differences in instruments and applicable
statutory requirements. The two agencies must treat similar products in a similar fashion, but there is no
obligation that the agencies treat such products identically. 31 Reading these provisions together, a joint
rulemaking seems to require closer coordination and a more similar outcome than a mere consultative,
coordinated rulemaking, but joint rules need not achieve identical results for similar products.
31 Section 712(a)(7)(B) of Dodd-Frank.
Congress anticipated and attempted to prevent a regulatory end-run, by which one agency could subsequently
issue an interpretation to undercut a joint rule. There is a requirement that any subsequent interpretation or
guidance by the SEC or CFTC concerning items subject to joint rulemaking shall be effective only if issued
jointly by the two agencies after consulting with the Federal Reserve. To make the agencies' task still more
difficult, Congress required that the joint rules be adopted within 360 days of Dodd-Frank's enactment, or July
16, 2011. 32
32 Section 712(e) of Dodd-Frank.
Provisions Weakening Joint Rulemaking Requirements
In addition to progressively weakening the concept of joint rulemaking, as the legislative process went on,
Congress simultaneously adopted provisions in Title VII anticipating and perhaps encouraging the SEC and
CFTC to engage in a less than harmonious joint rulemaking process.
First, Title VII affirms that each of the two agencies can unilaterally bring actions to enforce its jurisdiction. 33 Im
plicit in the authority to enforce a law is the ability to interpret that law. This affirmation seems to undercut, if not
directly conflict with, the Title VII limitation preventing the two agencies from independently asserting jurisdiction
in the swaps arena. Even assuming a successful joint rulemaking dividing jurisdiction, over time the number and
scope of differences in interpretations of those rules by the agencies may become magnified. Notwithstanding
the language limiting improper assertions of jurisdiction, it is difficult to foresee situations where one agency
could credibly rush to protect an industry participant from enforcement of Dodd-Frank by the other.
33 Section 712(a)(4) of Dodd-Frank.
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Second, although Dodd-Frank requires that these several definitional rules be adopted jointly, there are parallel
provisions that specifically permit the CFTC and the SEC, respectively to further define the term “swap” and
“security-based swap,” to capture products that have been structured to evade the requirements of Dodd-Frank.
34 Whereas the Administration proposal and the bill as introduced in the Senate provided for joint anti-
avoidance rulemakings, the final provisions contain no reference to a joint exercise. 35 Statutory provisions
ordinarily should be interpreted in pari materia, to give effect to all relevant provisions; notwithstanding the
general requirement of consultation for all Title VII rulemakings, however, either agency arguably could rely on
the final anti-avoidance provisions as a means of enlarging its jurisdiction and avoiding joint action.
34 Sections 721(c) and 761(b)(3) of Dodd-Frank.
35 Obama Legislative Proposal, supra, § 711(b)(2); S.3127 as introduced on April 15, 2010, § 711(b)(2).
Third, while it is clear that the DC Circuit may not accord deference to an agency rule that is subject to
challenge by the other agency, Dodd-Frank does not address the degree of deference that courts should accord
to the SEC and CFTC when subsequently interpreting or administering the rules that they jointly adopt.
Interpretations of Title VII requirements must be jointly adopted in order to be effective, but it is unlikely that the
two agencies could act quickly in providing joint interpretations and a market participant would be foolhardy to
ignore an interpretation issued by either agency alone. This omission effectively weakens the overarching
emphasis in Title VII that similar products be treated similarly and essentially forces market participants to
comply with practically-different, if not conflicting, SEC and CFTC interpretations of joint rules.
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Dodd-Frank creates two mechanisms to address and resolve situations where the SEC and the CFTC cannot
agree in their joint rulemakings, but both processes have profound weaknesses.
If the SEC and the CFTC cannot agree to adopt rules jointly, at the request of either agency, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) may act as “tie-breaker” and can side with either agency's rulemaking
approach or broker a compromise position. 36 Dodd-Frank does not specify the process that the FSOC must
follow in making such a determination; the FSOC need only consider relevant information, make a determination
within a reasonable timeframe, and provide the agencies a written explanation for its decision. 37 FSOC
determinations are made by a super-majority vote of two-thirds of FSOC members and are not binding. 38 Mor
eover, it is not clear that the FSOC mechanism precludes an aggrieved agency from bringing a court challenge
to a joint rulemaking. One wonders if this nonbinding FSOC procedure will ever be used.
36 Section 712(d)(3) of Dodd-Frank. The FSOC is a new regulatory entity created by Dodd-Frank to identify risks to financial
stability, promote market discipline, and respond to emerging threats to financial stability. See Section 112(a) of Dodd-
Frank.
37 Section 119(c) of Dodd-Frank.
38 Section 119(d) of Dodd-Frank.
There is a separate, extensive scheme for either agency to initiate a judicial challenge of final rules issued by
the other agency, e.g., in situations where one agency may claim that the other agency has adopted rules that
encroach upon its own jurisdiction 39 or if one agency disagrees with the other agency's categorization of a
novel derivative product. 40 In these circumstances, the offended agency can apply for expedited judicial
review by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“DC Circuit”).
39 Section 712(c) of Dodd-Frank.
40 Section 718(b) of Dodd-Frank.
While providing a judicial review mechanism in Title VII may make sense on its face, there are numerous
disadvantages to such an approach. A reviewing court would find it difficult to overturn one agency's rulemaking
solely because it differs from that of the challenging agency. A court may resist intervening in what it considers a
political question and instead assert that the agencies or the FSOC should properly resolve the matter. 41 Shou
ld the DC Circuit entertain a case, ordinarily it would defer to agency interpretation of any ambiguous provision
in Title VII, recognizing the agency's unique ability to interpret statutes that the agency administers. 42 Dodd-
Frank precludes the DC Circuit from giving deference, however, where either the SEC or CFTC challenges the
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rulemaking of the other agency. 43 This provision both reinforces a court's obligation to issue an even-handed
ruling, and makes review more difficult.
41 At least one court has expressed frustration in a case where the SEC and the CFTC previously were unable to resolve
their jurisdictional differences consensually. See, e.g., SEC v. Sentinel Management Group, Inc. (U.S.D.C., N.D. Ill.
Aug. 20, 2007) (transcript of the proceedings at 27, available at http://www.sentinelcommittee.com/pdfs/1100.pdf).
(“Why doesn't this agency of the government go over and talk to this agency of the government and get your act together,
for crying out loud … These are two agencies of the United States of America. Why don't you talk to each other and sort it
out.”). One can expect that the DC Circuit similarly would not welcome the opportunity to review and resolve two dueling
approaches that should be “joint.”
42 This principle is memorialized in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984),
and is often referred to as “Chevron deference”.
43 Section 712(c)(3)(A) of Dodd-Frank.
Interpretive Dilemmas
In the end, Congress attempted to resolve its conflicting policy goals by choosing both: promote uniformity in
rulemaking and maintain the functional regulatory split between the SEC and the CFTC. In the process of
making this “compromise,” Congress raised a host of interpretive questions. On the one hand, Congress
appears to have recognized that different products and markets can serve as economic substitutes and that if
the agencies adopt rules that leave gaps or are inconsistent, there is a danger of regulatory arbitrage by
exploitation of these gaps and inconsistencies. Hence Congress required the adoption of similar, joint rules. On
the other hand, by not requiring uniform rulemaking, Congress seems to have empowered the agencies to
permit such arbitrage opportunities. Does joint rulemaking in its present form prevent arbitrage and encourage
the SEC and CFTC to implement a policy of increased regulation in a previously unregulated area or is it a
subterfuge to allow the markets to pick their own regulator or avoid regulation altogether?
Do the joint rulemaking provisions in Title VII operate as a mechanism to promote a de facto merger of the two
agencies or do they simply preserve the status quo? Agency lawyers may parse the legislative text to justify any
of a number of regulatory approaches along a continuum, to require only loose consultation between the
agencies, or to require the agencies to adopt rules that are as close to identical as possible, or something in
between. We can infer that joint rules are closer on the continuum to identical rules than consultative rules, but
is that the only way to interpret the two rulemaking alternatives? Is there merely a linguistic, rather than a
substantive difference between the two? Is there an objective standard we can apply? Unfortunately, there is
little in the way of helpful judicial guidance as to what is meant by a joint or a consultative rulemaking. 44
44 For example, a court considered what is required for consultative agency action in the environmental law field, and gave
very little direction. In Washington Toxics Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Services, 457
F. Supp.2d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2004), the court chose not to decide the issue, finding that an unclear, unspecific statute
on the process of consultation left it to the agency's discretion “to create a range of types of consultation.” While
acknowledging this wide discretion, the court warned that the agencies must consult in some form nonetheless. Id. at 1179.
It is quite possible that a court considering the requirements for a joint rulemaking could give equally unclear guidance to the
CFTC and SEC about how to approach “jointness.”
Practical Considerations
The absence of guidance in Title VII concerning the scope of joint rulemaking means that one must resort to
practical considerations to discern how “joint” a joint rulemaking must be. One can foresee instances in which
agency staffs compromise and cooperate to adopt nearly identical, final rules that will be binding on all market
participants. A different, more contentious process might be followed, however, with endless exchanges of draft
regulations but no agreement as to substance. Differences in approach could intensify over time. After a notice
and comment period, the two agencies could simply announce the adoption of widely discrepant but “jointly
issued” rules. One of the two agencies could challenge the other agency's rule, or both could declare the
process a success.
Most likely, agency rules will be deemed to be sufficiently joint when the two agencies agree to pronounce that
the rules satisfy that standard, regardless of the substantive differences in those rules, simply to avoid the
prospect of embarrassing litigation. There are few venues available in all but the most egregious cases to
challenge instances where the agencies agree that a rulemaking is joint. Industry participants could challenge
the agencies, but there may be an inherent hesitancy to bring one's regulator to court if the alternative regulator
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participated in the process and agrees with the challenged result. Legislative oversight committees can
challenge rulemakings as contrary to Congressional intent in enacting Dodd-Frank, through requiring the
testimony of agency heads, but that approach is less effective when, as now, the two houses of Congress are
controlled by different political parties.
Progress to Date
It is too early to assess the results of the SEC's and the CFTC's joint rulemakings, but not surprisingly the two
agencies already have stressed that they are working closely and cooperatively together. 45 In December
2010, the SEC and CFTC tackled the easier half of their task by publishing for notice and comment proposed
rules further refining the terms “swap dealer,” “security-based swap dealer,” “major swap participant,” and
“major security-based swap participant.” The two agencies have not yet addressed in a published proposal,
however, the more difficult half of their joint rulemaking obligation, refining the definitions of the terms “swap,”
“security-based swap,” and “mixed swap,” and “security-based swap agreement.” 46 The first group defines
market participants, while the second set essentially and more importantly defines the markets themselves.
45 See, e.g., Testimony of CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler before the House Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on
General Farm Commodities and Risk Management (Dec. 15, 2010).
46 On August 13, 2010, the two agencies issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (“ANPR”) in which they invited
public comment on how to further define those terms subject to joint rulemaking, but without giving any preliminary indication
as to how they would approach the task. In the ANPR, the agencies simply encouraged commenters to address aspects of
the definitions such as the extent to which the definitions should be based on qualitative or quantitative factors and what
those factors should be, any analogous areas of law, economics, or industry practice, and any factors specific to the
commenter's experience. The comment period closed on September 20 and the agencies have not taken further action on
the matter. See CFTC RIN 3235-AK65, SEC Release No. 34-62717, 75 Fed. Reg. 51429 (Aug. 20, 2010)
We now have a better understanding of how the agencies interpret the boundaries of the term “joint,” and large
degrees of difference can be tolerated. Although the December proposals were issued jointly, they are by no
means identical. For example, the CFTC's proposed rule identifies a “major swap participant” as an entity that
has “a current uncollateralized exposure of $5 billion, or a combined current uncollateralized exposure and
potential future exposure of $8 billion, across the entirety of an entity's swap positions.” 47 In contrast, the
SEC's companion rule identifies a “major security-based swap participant” as an entity with “a current
uncollateralized exposure of $2 billion, or a combined current uncollateralized exposure and potential future
exposure of $4 billion, across the entirety of an entity's security-based swap positions.” 48 More recently, the
SEC and the CFTC proposed companion rules regarding security-based swap execution facilities and swap
execution facilities, but they differed fundamentally. The SEC approach 49 would allow a market participant to
trade in security-based swaps after requesting a quote from only a single dealer, whereas the CFTC’ would
require a market participant using a swap execution facility to request quotes from at least five dealers before
engaging in trade. 50 If both rules are adopted without change, there could be a large difference in
transparency and liquidity between the swaps and security-based swaps markets. 51 The CFTC and the SEC
may choose to align their final rules on swap execution facilities to avoid this result or they may coordinate by
choosing simply to treat their respective constituent markets differently.
47 CFTC RIN 3038–AD06; SEC Release No. 34–63452; 75 Fed. Reg. 80173, 80198 (Dec. 21, 2010).
48 Id.
49 SEC Release No. 34–63825, 76 Fed. Reg.10948 (Feb. 28, 2011).
50 CFTC RIN 3038–AD18, 76 Fed. Reg.1214 (Jan. 7, 2011).
51 See, e.g., Financial Times Article SEC at Odds with CFTC on Swap Trade Rules by Michael Mackenzie and Aline van
Duyn, February 3, 2011.
The agencies have also declared that they are aware of the risks inherent in joint and consultative rulemakings.
In nodding to the principle of reducing the potential for regulatory arbitrage, the CFTC and SEC recently asked
in a notice of proposed rulemaking if their two approaches are comparable or different, and whether any
difference is likely to have any impact on market participants. The agencies also asked whether their regulatory
approaches will require duplicative or inconsistent efforts by market participants subject to both regimes or
result in regulatory gaps. 52 It remains to be seen how market participants will react to those questions and how
the SEC and the CFTC will incorporate those comments in final rules.
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52 See, e.g., SEC Release No. 34–63556 (Dec. 15, 2010) regarding end-user exceptions to mandatory clearing of
security-based swaps.
Conclusion
As the markets become increasingly innovative with swaps products, the line between the SEC's and the
CFTC's jurisdiction becomes increasingly blurred. While the SEC and the CFTC have a history of jurisdictional
conflict over swaps, such conflict is wasteful of agency resources, retards innovation, and potentially damages
the competitiveness of the United States financial markets. A spectrum of solutions to this jurisdictional conflict
has been proposed, ranging from merger of the agencies to informal cooperation. Title VII of Dodd-Frank
represents a political compromise on the issue, by requiring the SEC and the CFTC to adopt some rules jointly,
and others in consultation. Dodd-Frank also includes dispute resolution mechanisms, anticipating fears that the
SEC and the CFTC will be unable to agree on how to regulate swaps.
The joint rulemakings in Title VII can be viewed as an experiment as to whether the SEC's and CFTC's cultural
differences can be overcome, at least to the extent of regulating swaps. From one perspective, if the
rulemakings are sufficiently joint to be perceived as successful, one could infer that a template has been created
for additional Congressional mandates that will naturally lead to a synthetic merger of the agencies. A failure to
adopt joint regulations would reinforce perceptions that the status quo must continue because the markets are
so different.
There is, however, a second, perhaps counterintuitive interpretation of the results of this experiment. A joint
rulemaking process that is truly effective and result in more efficient market regulation could make the case
against merging the agencies in the future; the two agencies will have proved they can coexist successfully and
efficiently. If, however, the process disintegrates into litigation or recrimination, the case for more effective
regulation through agency merger may be stronger.
Note to Readers
The editors of BNA's Securities Regulation & Law Report invite the submission for publication of articles of
interest to practitioners.
Prospective authors should contact the Managing Editor, BNA's Securities Regulation & Law Report, 1801 S.
Bell St. Arlington, Va. 22202-4501; telephone (703) 341-3889; or e-mail to sjenkins@bna.com.
Attorney Focus
SEC Defense Lawyers Well-Advised to Consider Criminal Exposure Early On
ENFORCEMENT
In the new era of cooperation between the Securities and Exchange Commission and criminal prosecutors, SEC
defense lawyers should consider the possibility of criminal exposure from the outset, New York lawyer Mauro M.
Wolfe, Duane Morris LLP, told BNA in a Feb. 22 interview.
He also suggested that to the extent a practitioner is not comfortable in the criminal arena, he or she should get
criminal defense counsel involved early in the investigation. While prosecutors once were unlikely to pursue
smaller Ponzi scams or routine pump-and-dump violations, Wolfe cautioned, “in today's world, I think most
prosecutors would be interested.”
Wiretap Evidence
Wolfe made his remarks against the background of a parallel proceeding in which a dispute over the SEC's right
to the Justice Department's wiretap evidence has highlighted constitutional and other tensions inherent in the
dual enforcement process. In the controversy, Galleon Management LP principal Raj Rajaratnam and other
defendants are facing SEC and related DOJ charges in what authorities have called the largest hedge fund
insider trading case in U.S. history (41 SRLR 1937, 10/26/09).
While the SEC obtained the wiretap evidence in the Galleon case indirectly through the civil discovery process,
Wolfe said practitioners are—or should be—concerned that wiretaps and other tools currently available only in
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